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#Evidence of #Influenza A(#H5N1) #Spillover Infections in #Horses, #Mongolia

Source: Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/1/24-1266_article

Abstract
Recent outbreaks of influenza A(H5N1) have affected many mammal species. We report serologic evidence of H5N1 virus infection in horses in Mongolia. Because H3N8 equine influenza virus is endemic in many countries, horses should be monitored to prevent reassortment between equine and avian influenza viruses with unknown consequences.

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Emerging Infectious Diseases journal logo
Emerging Infectious Diseases journalEvidence of Influenza A(H5N1) Spillover Infections in Horses, MongoliaEvidence of H5N1 Influenza Spillover Infections in Horses, Mongolia

#Transmission #dynamics of highly pathogenic avian #influenza virus at the #wildlife#poultry – #environmental #interface: A case study

Source: OneHealth, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352771424002581?via%3Dihub

Abstract
Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) regularly circulate between wild and domestic bird populations. Following several high-profile outbreaks, highly pathogenic AIVs (HPAIV) with zoonotic potential have been the subject of increasing attention. While we know that HPAIV is transmitted between domestic birds, wildlife, and the environment, little is known about persistence and spillover/back at these interfaces. We integrated the test results of samples collected on and around an infected domestic poultry premise (IP) where H5N1 HPAIV was confirmed in a flock of poultry in 2022 in Southern Ontario, Canada to explore the transmission cycle of AIVs in wildlife and the environment. We sampled a captive flock of Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) that resided on site, sediment samples collected from water bodies on site, and examined samples collected through surveillance within a 100 km radius of the IP from live wild ducks and sick and dead wildlife. We found serologic evidence of H5 exposure in the captive mallards that resided on site despite no evidence of morbidity or mortality in these birds and no PCR positive detections from samples collected at two different timepoints. Genetic material from the same H5N1 HPAIV subtype circulating in the domestic birds and from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses were detected in wetlands on site. The results of live and sick and dead surveillance conducted within a 100 km radius confirmed that the virus was circulating in wildlife before and after IP confirmation. These results suggest that biosecurity remains the most critical aspect of minimising spillover/back risk in a virus that has been shown to circulate in asymptomatic wild birds and persist in the surrounding environment.

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Establishing #methods to #monitor #H5N1 #influenza virus in dairy #cattle #milk

Source: MedRxIV, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.12.04.24318491v1

Abstract
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza strain H5N1 has caused a multi-state outbreak among US dairy cattle, spreading across 15 states and infecting hundreds of herds since its onset. We rapidly developed and optimized PCR-based detection assays and sequencing protocols to support H5N1 molecular surveillance. Using 214 retail milk from 20 states for methods development, we found that H5N1 concentrations by digital PCR strongly correlated with qPCR cycle threshold (Ct) values, with dPCR exhibiting greater sensitivity. We also found that metagenomic sequencing after hybrid selection was best for higher concentration samples while amplicon sequencing performs best for lower concentrations. By establishing these methods, we were able to support the creation of a statewide surveillance program to test bulk milk samples monthly from all cattle dairy farms within Massachusetts, which remain negative to date. The methods, workflow, and recommendations described here provide a framework for others aiming to conduct H5N1 surveillance efforts.

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medRxiv · Establishing methods to monitor H5N1 influenza virus in dairy cattle milkHighly Pathogenic Avian Influenza strain H5N1 has caused a multi-state outbreak among US dairy cattle, spreading across 15 states and infecting hundreds of herds since its onset. We rapidly developed and optimized PCR-based detection assays and sequencing protocols to support H5N1 molecular surveillance. Using 214 retail milk from 20 states for methods development, we found that H5N1 concentrations by digital PCR strongly correlated with qPCR cycle threshold (Ct) values, with dPCR exhibiting greater sensitivity. We also found that metagenomic sequencing after hybrid selection was best for higher concentration samples while amplicon sequencing performs best for lower concentrations. By establishing these methods, we were able to support the creation of a statewide surveillance program to test bulk milk samples monthly from all cattle dairy farms within Massachusetts, which remain negative to date. The methods, workflow, and recommendations described here provide a framework for others aiming to conduct H5N1 surveillance efforts. ### Competing Interest Statement P.C.S. is co-founder and shareholder in Sherlock Biosciences and Delve Bio, and is a board member and shareholder of Danaher Corporation. DHO is a co-founder and managing member of Pathogenuity LLC. ### Funding Statement This work was supported by funding from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) Investigator Program (to P.C.S.), the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (BAA 75D30122C15113 to P.C.S and PGCoE NU50CK000629 to S.W., L.M., P.C.S, and B.L.M.), and the NIH National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (GCID U19AI110818 to P.C.S. and D.J.P. and CREID U01AI151812 to P.C.S.). J.A.S. is supported in this project by philanthropic funding from the TED Audacious Project. D.H.O. and W.V. were funded by Heart of Racing and the UW Institute for Clinical and Translational Researchs Pilot Award program. This publication was supported by the Office of Advanced Molecular Detection, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through Cooperative Agreement Number CK22-2204. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views or policies of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the U.S. government. This study has been approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. ### Author Declarations I confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained. Yes I confirm that all necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived, and that any patient/participant/sample identifiers included were not known to anyone (e.g., hospital staff, patients or participants themselves) outside the research group so cannot be used to identify individuals. Yes I understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance). Yes I have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines, such as any relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material, if applicable. Yes All data produced in the present study are available upon reasonable request to the authors

A single #mutation in #bovine #influenza #H5N1 #hemagglutinin switches specificity to #human #receptors

Source: Science, https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adt0180

Editor’s summary

In 2021, a highly pathogenic influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus was detected in North America that is capable of infecting a diversity of avian species, marine mammals, and humans. In 2024, clade 2.3.4.4b virus spread widely in dairy cattle in the US, causing a few mild human cases, but retaining specificity for avian receptors. Historically, this virus has caused up to 30% fatality in humans, so Lin et al. performed a genetic and structural analysis of the mutations necessary to fully switch host receptor recognition. A single glutamic acid to leucine mutation at residue 226 of the virus hemagglutinin was sufficient to enact the change from avian to human specificity. In nature, the occurrence of this single mutation could be an indicator of human pandemic risk. —Caroline Ash

Abstract

In 2024, several human infections with highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b bovine influenza H5N1 viruses in the United States raised concerns about their capability for bovine-to-human or even human-to-human transmission. In this study, analysis of the hemagglutinin (HA) from the first-reported human-infecting bovine H5N1 virus (A/Texas/37/2024, Texas) revealed avian-type receptor binding preference. Notably, a Gln226Leu substitution switched Texas HA binding specificity to human-type receptors, which was enhanced when combined with an Asn224Lys mutation. Crystal structures of the Texas HA with avian receptor analog LSTa and its Gln226Leu mutant with human receptor analog LSTc elucidated the structural basis for this preferential receptor recognition. These findings highlight the need for continuous surveillance of emerging mutations in avian and bovine clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses.

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Controlling minor #outbreaks is necessary to #prepare for major #pandemics

Source: PLoS Biology, Perspective, https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3002945

{Summary}

Ongoing influenza H5N1 outbreaks highlight the need for timely, scalable interventions that draw on lessons from COVID-19. In particular, successful pandemic preparedness requires early outbreak management, including effective responses targeting spillovers before there is evidence of human-to-human transmission.

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journals.plos.orgControlling minor outbreaks is necessary to prepare for major pandemicsOngoing influenza H5N1 outbreaks highlight the need for timely, scalable interventions that draw on lessons from COVID-19. This Perspective discussed that successful pandemic preparedness requires early outbreak management, including effective responses targeting spillovers before evidence of human-to-human transmission exists.

Structural Convergence and Water-Mediated Substrate Mimicry Enable Broad #Neuraminidase #Inhibition by #Human #Antibodies

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.11.27.625426v1?rss=1

Abstract
Influenza has been responsible for multiple global pandemics and seasonal epidemics and claimed millions of lives. The imminent threat of a panzootic outbreak of avian influenza H5N1 virus underscores the urgent need for pandemic preparedness and effective countermeasures, including monoclonal antibodies (mAbs). Here, we characterize human mAbs that target the highly conserved catalytic site of viral neuraminidase (NA), termed NCS mAbs, and the molecular basis of their broad specificity. Cross-reactive NA-specific B cells were isolated by using stabilized NA probes of non-circulating subtypes. We found that NCS mAbs recognized multiple NAs of influenza A as well as influenza B NAs and conferred prophylactic protections in mice against H1N1, H5N1, and influenza B viruses. Cryo-electron microscopy structures of two NCS mAbs revealed that they rely on structural mimicry of sialic acid, the substrate of NA, by coordinating not only amino acid side chains but also water molecules, enabling inhibition of NA activity across multiple influenza A and B viruses, including avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. Our results provide a molecular basis for the broad reactivity and inhibitory activity of NCS mAbs targeting the catalytic site of NA through substrate mimicry.

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bioRxiv · Structural Convergence and Water-Mediated Substrate Mimicry Enable Broad Neuraminidase Inhibition by Human AntibodiesInfluenza has been responsible for multiple global pandemics and seasonal epidemics and claimed millions of lives. The imminent threat of a panzootic outbreak of avian influenza H5N1 virus underscores the urgent need for pandemic preparedness and effective countermeasures, including monoclonal antibodies (mAbs). Here, we characterize human mAbs that target the highly conserved catalytic site of viral neuraminidase (NA), termed NCS mAbs, and the molecular basis of their broad specificity. Cross-reactive NA-specific B cells were isolated by using stabilized NA probes of non-circulating subtypes. We found that NCS mAbs recognized multiple NAs of influenza A as well as influenza B NAs and conferred prophylactic protections in mice against H1N1, H5N1, and influenza B viruses. Cryo-electron microscopy structures of two NCS mAbs revealed that they rely on structural mimicry of sialic acid, the substrate of NA, by coordinating not only amino acid side chains but also water molecules, enabling inhibition of NA activity across multiple influenza A and B viruses, including avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. Our results provide a molecular basis for the broad reactivity and inhibitory activity of NCS mAbs targeting the catalytic site of NA through substrate mimicry. ### Competing Interest Statement J.L., D.E., B.S.G., N.P.K., and M.K. are named inventors of a patent application describing engineered influenza neuraminidase antigens (WO/2021/178621) filed by the University of Washington and the Department of Health and Human Services, USA.

#Influenza A(#H5N1) Virus Clade 2.3.2.1a in #Traveler Returning to #Australia from #India, 2024

Source: Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/1/24-1210_article

Abstract
We report highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus clade 2.3.2.1a in a child traveler returning to Australia from India. The virus was a previously unreported reassortant consisting of clade 2.3.2.1a, 2.3.4.4b, and wild bird low pathogenicity avian influenza gene segments. These findings highlight surveillance gaps in South Asia.

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Emerging Infectious Diseases journal logo
Emerging Infectious Diseases journalInfluenza A(H5N1) Virus Clade 2.3.2.1a in Traveler Returning to Australia from India, 2024Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Traveler

#Pandemic #preparedness of effective #vaccines for the outbreak of newly #H5N1 highly pathogenic avian #influenza virus

Source: Virologica Sinica, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1995820X24001779?via%3Dihub

Highlights

— Analyzed the outbreak situation and viral characteristics of the newly H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus.

— The current approval and research and development of the H5N1 HPAI vaccines were summarized.

Proposed vaccine development approaches against newly H5N1 virus, e.g. adjuvanted vaccine, mRNA vaccine, multivalent vaccine.

— Discussed other prevention and control strategies, e.g. poultry vaccination, global surveillance and comprehensive testing.

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Polygenic #Determinants of #H5N1 #Adaptation to Bovine Cells

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.11.29.626120v1

Abstract
H5N1 avian influenza virus (lineage 2.3.4.4b, B3.13 genotype) has caused, unexpectedly, a large outbreak in dairy cattle in North America. It is critical to ascertain how this virus has specifically adapted to bovine cells and the molecular determinants of this process. Here, we focused on the contribution of the viral internal genomic segments of H5N1 B3.13 to bovine cells adaptation. We generated 45 reassortant viruses harbouring the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase from A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 and internal gene constellations from several influenza A viruses (IAV) or carrying segment swaps between distinct H5N1 strains. The recombinant B3.13 viruses displayed faster replication kinetics in bovine cells compared to other IAV. Importantly, multiple genomic segments of B3.13 viruses contribute to their faster replicative fitness. Further, recombinants with the B3.13 internal genes were less susceptible than ancestral 2.3.4.4b strain to the bovine IFN response. However, bovine (and human) MX1, a key restriction factor for avian IAV, restricted both ancestral 2.3.4.4b and B3.13 recombinant viruses. Interestingly, the latter escape restriction from human BTN3A3. Finally, recombinant B3.13 was virulent in mice unlike the ancestor 2.3.4.4b recombinant virus. Our results highlight the polygenic nature of influenza host range as multiple internal genes of B3.13 contribute to bovine adaptation.

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bioRxiv · POLYGENIC DETERMINANTS OF H5N1 ADAPTATION TO BOVINE CELLSH5N1 avian influenza virus (lineage 2.3.4.4b, B3.13 genotype) has caused, unexpectedly, a large outbreak in dairy cattle in North America. It is critical to ascertain how this virus has specifically adapted to bovine cells and the molecular determinants of this process. Here, we focused on the contribution of the viral internal genomic segments of H5N1 B3.13 to bovine cells adaptation. We generated 45 reassortant viruses harbouring the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase from A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 and internal gene constellations from several influenza A viruses (IAV) or carrying segment swaps between distinct H5N1 strains. The recombinant B3.13 viruses displayed faster replication kinetics in bovine cells compared to other IAV. Importantly, multiple genomic segments of B3.13 viruses contribute to their faster replicative fitness. Further, recombinants with the B3.13 internal genes were less susceptible than ancestral 2.3.4.4b strain to the bovine IFN response. However, bovine (and human) MX1, a key restriction factor for avian IAV, restricted both ancestral 2.3.4.4b and B3.13 recombinant viruses. Interestingly, the latter escape restriction from human BTN3A3. Finally, recombinant B3.13 was virulent in mice unlike the ancestor 2.3.4.4b recombinant virus. Our results highlight the polygenic nature of influenza host range as multiple internal genes of B3.13 contribute to bovine adaptation. ### Competing Interest Statement The authors have declared no competing interest.

#USA, Novel #Influenza A #H5N1 Virus {week 47, FluView}: 2 new cases in California (State Total = 31)

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2024-week-47.html

{Excerpts}

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Two confirmed human infections with influenza A(H5) viruses were reported to CDC this week by the California Department of Public Health. To date, human-to-human transmission of influenza A(H5) virus has not been identified in the United States.

These cases occurred in workers at commercial dairy cattle farms in areas where highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses had been detected in cows. There have now been 31 total confirmed cases and one probable human case in California.

Both individuals reported this week are ≥18 years old. These individuals had mild symptoms, which they reported to local health department officials. Specimens were collected from the individuals and were initially tested at state or local public health laboratories using the CDC influenza A(H5) assay before being sent to CDC for further testing. Specimens from the confirmed cases were positive for influenza A(H5) virus using diagnostic RT-PCR at CDC. Additional analysis including genetic sequencing is underway.

In response to these detections, additional case investigations and surveillance activities are being conducted by public health officials in California and Washington.

The CSTE position statement, which includes updated case definitions for confirmed, probable, and suspect cases is available at http://www.cste.org/resource/resmgr/position_statements_files_2023/24-ID-09_Novel_Influenza_A.pdf

An up-to-date human case summary during the 2024 outbreak by state and exposure source is available at http://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html

Information about avian influenza is available at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/index.htm.

Interim recommendations for Prevention, Monitoring, and Public Health Investigations are available at https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/prevention/hpai-interim-recommendations.html.

The latest case reports on avian influenza outbreaks in wild birds, commercial poultry, backyard or hobbyist flocks, and mammals in the United States are available from the USDA at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/animal-disease-information/avian/avian-influenza/2022-hpai.

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FluViewWeekly US Influenza Surveillance Report: Key Updates for Week 47, ending November 23, 2024By CDC

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/prevention/farm-workers.html

{Excerpt}

Summary

H5N1 bird flu is a virus that has been found in cows. It can also be found in poultry and other animals. People who work with infected animals or their byproducts (for example, raw milk), such as dairy and poultry workers, might get sick from the virus. Your employer should develop a workplace health and safety plan and share it with you. This page was updated to include details about worker exposure levels and using appropriate personal protective equipment safely for each exposure level.

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https://etidioh.wordpress.com/2024/11/08/information-for-workers-exposed-to-h5n1-birdflu/

Avian Influenza (Bird Flu)Information for Workers Exposed to H5N1 Bird FluBy CDC

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/prevention/hpai-interim-recommendations.html

{Excerpt}

Summary

The purpose of this guidance is to outline CDC's recommendations for preventing exposures to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses, infection prevention and control measures including the use of personal protective equipment, testing, antiviral treatment, patient investigations, monitoring of exposed persons (including persons exposed to sick or dead wild and domesticated animals and livestock with suspected or confirmed infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus), and antiviral chemoprophylaxis of exposed persons. These recommendations are based on available information and will be updated as needed when new information becomes available.

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https://etidioh.wordpress.com/2024/11/08/highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-ah5n1-virus-interim-recommendations-for-prevention-monitoring-and-public-health-investigations/

Avian Influenza (Bird Flu)Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus: Interim Recommendations for Prevention, Monitoring, and Public Health InvestigationsBy CDC

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/73/wr/mm7344a3.htm?s_cid=mm7344a3_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM140166&ACSTrackingLabel=This%20Week%20in%20MMWR%3A%20Vol.%2073%2C%20November%207%2C%202024&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM140166

Summary

What is already known about this topic?

Infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses have been detected sporadically in dairy farm workers in the United States since April 2024. Public health response efforts include active monitoring of workers exposed to HPAI A(H5) virus for illness.

What is added by this report?

Health officials conducted surveys and serologic testing to identify recent HPAI A(H5) infections among dairy workers in two states. Serologic testing indicated that 7% of participating dairy workers had evidence of recent infection with HPAI A(H5) virus.

What are the implications for public health practice?

The findings support the need for active monitoring of exposed workers and testing to detect and treat HPAI A(H5) infections, including those in persons with very mild symptoms. These efforts should be coupled with farmworker education about infection risks and prevention measures.

Abstract
Since April 2024, sporadic infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses have been detected among dairy farm workers in the United States. To date, infections have mostly been detected through worker monitoring, and have been mild despite the possibility of more severe illness. During June–August 2024, CDC collaborated with the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment to implement cross-sectional serologic surveys to ascertain the prevalence of recent infection with HPAI A(H5) virus among dairy workers. In both states, a convenience sample of persons who work in dairies was interviewed, and blood specimens were collected. Among 115 persons, eight (7%; 95% CI = 3.6%–13.1%) had serologic evidence of recent infection with A(H5) virus; all reported milking cows or cleaning the milking parlor. Among persons with serologic evidence of infection, four recalled being ill around the time cows were ill; symptoms began before or within a few days of A(H5) virus detections among cows. This finding supports the need to identify and implement strategies to prevent transmission among dairy cattle to reduce worker exposures and for education and outreach to dairy workers concerning prevention, symptoms, and where to seek medical care if the workers develop symptoms. Timely identification of infected herds can support rapid initiation of monitoring, testing, and treatment for human illness, including mild illness, among exposed dairy workers.

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https://etidioh.wordpress.com/2024/11/07/serologic-evidence-of-recent-infection-with-highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-ah5-virus-among-dairy-workers-michigan-and-colorado-june-august-2024-7-of-workers-were-posi/

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention · Serologic Evidence of Recent Infection with Highly ..By CDC

Source: Department of Health, http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/phcommon/public/media/mediapubhpdetail.cfm?prid=4872

{Excerpt}

The Los Angeles County Department is investigating possible sources of H5 avian flu, which has been detected at low levels for the first time at one of the wastewater sampling sites in Los Angeles County.

H5N1 is one type of avian influenza that has been spreading among birds and mammals, leading to a nationwide outbreak. There are no reports of human H5N1 cases in Los Angeles County and the overall risk of H5N1 to LA County residents remains low. There is no evidence of sustained human to human transmission with this strain of H5N1.

Public Health is actively engaging key risk groups such as dairy and meat processing sites to identify possible sources of H5 avian flu in wastewater. The virus may have been introduced into wastewater by discarded contaminated animal products, infected wild bird droppings entering the sewage system, or animal infection. Public Health routinely monitors and tests symptomatic birds, pets, and wild mammals in LA County for H5N1 through our Public Health Laboratory.

Wastewater sampling is routinely performed as part of ongoing surveillance for infectious diseases including H5N1. H5 has previously been detected in wastewater in both northern and southern California. The virus has been detected in more than 200 dairies in California and there have been 16 human cases of avian flu in California. Public Health, in conjunction with the California Department of Public Health (CDPH), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state and federal agriculture agencies, has been tracking the situation closely.

While the current risk of transmission to LA County residents is low, Public Health encourages residents to follow these best practices when around animals or when consuming animal products:

Do not eat raw milk, raw cheese, and undercooked meat products.

Avoid unprotected contact with sick or dead animals, or materials contaminated with bird feces. The virus can spread to other birds, pets or mammals by contact with infected feces or consumption of infected animals.

Avoid handling wild birds and observe them only from a distance. If you have to handle wild birds, even if they appear healthy, practice good hand hygiene and consider wearing a well-fitting mask. Some birds may carry the virus but appear to be healthy.

Report sick or dead birds to local animal control agency for potential collection and testing. Sick birds or animals may not have flu-like symptoms, but instead may be unable to fly, have seizures, have difficulty walking or be found dead.

Prevent wild birds from getting into areas housing pet birds or poultry. Also make sure wild birds cannot defecate down into areas holding pet birds or poultry.

Take down bird feeders and communal bird baths to reduce the risk of the virus spreading from bird-to-bird.

Residents should also keep pets away from sick and dead birds. There is some risk of the virus being transmitted to mammals such as dogs, cats, and wild mammals, especially if they eat infected, uncooked birds.

It is especially important that people who may have exposure to infected or potentially infected birds or other animals get a seasonal flu vaccine. Seasonal flu vaccination will not prevent infection with avian influenza viruses but can reduce the risk of getting sick with human and bird flu viruses at the same time.

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https://etidioh.wordpress.com/2024/11/04/h5-avian-flu-detected-at-wastewater-sampling-site-in-losangeles-county-public-health-closely-monitoring-situation-risk-remains-low/

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